Abstract-An increasing number of Phasor Measurement Unit(PMU) have been deployed in power grids to increase the observability. Recent studies have shown that PMU data can be used to detect the outage of lines. On the other side, modern power system becomes more prone to cyber attacks due to the highly integration of information technology and communication network. In this paper, we demonstrated that an attacker can mask the outage of a single line by attacking a set of critical measurements. A mixed integer linear programming model is proposed to minimize the number of attacked measurements. The IEEE 39-bus system is used to demonstrate the masking scheme.
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I. INTRODUCTION
OWER grid, one of critical infrastructures, is the backbone of a nation's economy and is critical to the homeland security. In particular, the blackouts around the globe in recent years have raised a great concern about the reliable and safe operation of power systems. In fact, some blackouts are triggered by the failures of a small number of components at the initial stage [1] .However, the control center was not aware of the potential risk or even did not detect such failures, thus no responding measures were taken to mitigate the risk. As a result, the initial failures of the components triggered the subsequent failures of more components and finally led to the system-wide blackout. From the perspective of a defender, it is essential to monitor the real-time operation state of a power system and detect the failures of components in time. Thanks to PMUs, it provides a good solution for us to improve the reliability of power systems since the data has the advantages of GPS-synchronization, high accuracy and near real-time transmission as compared to conventional sensors. Thus, the deployment of PMUs for grid sensing is widely considered to be a major driving force for improving the reliability of transmission networks.
Utilizing the advantages of PMU data, some detection methods have been developed to detect the outages of lines. In [2] , the authors proposed a single line outage detection model based on the known network information and PMU data at a subset of buses. In their model, an enumeration approach was used to compute the responding residual value for each line. If the residual of a line is less than a predetermined threshold value, then this line is thought to be outaged. To overcome the difficulty of line combinations, Zhu et al. in [3] formulated the outage problem as a sparse signal reconstruction problem. Greedy and coordinate descent based iterations were employed to obtain the optimal solution. Considering the current costs of deploying PMUs are still expensive, the authors in [4] further explored the optimal placement strategy for PMUs. The objective is to minimize the number of PMUs to be deployed which maximizing the distance differences between every two line outage combination. The problem is formulated as an integer programming problem, which is solved by greedy algorithm and improved branch and bound algorithm.
On the other hand, the widely deployment of traditional sensors as well as PMUs will raise the concern on the cyber security. Due to the tight integration between information and communication technologies and the physical components in power systems, an attacker has a chance to compromise the data generated by the Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems to confuse or misguide the state estimation. Liu et al. in [5] demonstrated that these attacks against state estimation can be undetectable by injecting the pre-designed false data into meters if the full topology and parameter information of a power grid is assumed to be known. Based on the corrupted data, the control center may make wrong decisions that lead to economic loss or insecure operations. Driven by the pioneering work in [5] , extensive researches have been done to investigate the impacts of false data injection attacks on the economic and reliable operation of power systems [6] - [15] . In particular, we in [16] showed that an attacker only needs to obtain the network information of the attacking region instead of that of the entire power network. This is done by making sure that the variations of phase angles of all boundary buses connected to the same island of the nonattacking region are the same. In [17] , we further presented a heuristic algorithm to find an optimal attacking region which requires the reduced network information. Some protective and detection methods have also been developed to mitigate the cyber risk.
Recently, Li et al. in [18] showed that an attacker can mask the topology of a power grid by injecting false data into a set of measurements. That is, when a line is out of service, an attacker sends false status information to the control center to represent the line is still connected. To avoid being detected, false data is designed to make the received data are consistent with the case that the line is connected. However, the proposed model in [18] is only suitable for the power grid without PMUs deployed for line outage detection. Consider a set of PMUs are deployed to detect line outages. When a line is outaged, the bus phase angles at the PMU buses will change, which allow a defender to detect the outage of the line by using the algorithms proposed in [2] - [4] . In this case, to achieve an undetectable attack, two conditions must be met:1)the injected false data can avoid the bad data detection in state estimation; 2)the line outage cannot be detected by PMU data sent to the control center.
In this paper, we will explore the possibility of compromising line outage detection by injecting false data. Our focus is to mask the outage of a single line. To mask the outage of a line, two conditions must be met:1)the injected false data can avoid the bad data detection in state estimation; 2)the line outage cannot be detected by PMU data sent to the control center.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews the concept of bad data attacks. Section III proposes a masking scheme to hide the outage of a single line. Section IV demonstrates the proposed model with the IEEE 39-bus system. Section V concludes the paper.
II. REVIEW OF BAD DATA INJECTION ATTACKS
In the transmission network, the bus voltages are around the rating voltage and the phase angle differences of the terminal buses of a line is small. These characteristics allow us to describe the power flows using In DC state estimation, the state vector ̂ is estimated by the least square method ̂= min || − || (5) where is the vector of measurements, and is the Jacobi matrix of the power grid.
To check the validity of the transmitted data, the control center will do the bad data test which calculates the 2-norm value of the error vector between the real measurements and corresponding estimated values. If it is greater than a given threshold value, bad data is thought to be existed. Thus, while performing the attacks, the attacker also tries to avoid being detected.
The residue is
In the bad data test, if the residue is less than a given threshold value, the estimated state ̂ is acceptable. Otherwise, there exit false data among the measurements.
From (7), we can see that if the injection false data vector ∆ and the state variation vector∆ satisfy ∆ = ∆ (8) The residue will not increase, so false data injection attacks on measurements can bypass the residual test.
The disadvantage of the general false data injection model is the lack of considerations of practical conditions of real power systems. For example, a strong mutual communication is usually built between a power plant and control center, so there is a high risk of being detected if an attacker chooses to attack the measurement at a generator bus. Additionally, the control center would doubt the data if the injecting false data is too large since the state estimator has the preknowledge of the load distribution of a power network and can predict loads using load forecasting techniques.
To make the false data injection attack model more practical, Yuan et al in [6] proposed a load redistribution attack model which sets some constraints on the general attack model:1) The output reading of a generator cannot be altered;2)The readings of the measurement at a load bus can be attacked within certain ranges.
The mathematical model can be formulates as (9) ensures that summation of injection powers at load buses equals to zero since the readings of generators cannot be changed. Constraint (10) limits the attacking amount within a certain range. Constraint (11) constructs the corresponding attacking vector of line measurements.
III. MATHEMATICAL FORMULATION
In this section, we first review the principle of line outage detection using PMU data, and then reveal that the detection approach will fail due to the interruption of bad data injection.
A. Principle of line outage detection
In real power systems, the topology of a power grid is changing due to natural or malicious attacks and economic operations such as line switching. Thus, to monitor the realtime status of the topology of a power network, it is essential for the control center to detect the outages of lines. the status of breakers will be transmitted to the control center. If a line is in service, 1 will be sent; 0 will be sent otherwise.
Before the outage, the phase angle vector is calculated by = To avoid recalculating the matrix − , it was shown that the line outage can be simulated by injecting additional powers ∆ , −∆ at the terminal buses of the outaged line while keeping the topology of the power network unchanged [19] . That is, the outaged line is assumed to be in service. Define the vector as follows, 
Then, the phase angle changes at PMU buses are calculated by (16 
To detect if there is line outage and which line is disconnected, we assume that line is out of service, then we calculate
where ∆ is the observed phase angle change vector at PMU buses.
Without the interruption of bad data, the residual is attributed to the measuring errors of sensors. In the normal condition, it is small. Hence, the line that minimizes the value of is identified as the outaged line. If the value of is large for all the lines, then the control center is reasonable to think that there are no outaged lines. We will show that the detection principle provides a chance for an attacker to confuse the control center by carefully designing the false data. 
B. Determining the optimal attacking region
In section, we investigate the principle of making the outage of a single line. That is, when a line is physically disconnected, however 1 will be sent to the control center to represent the line is connected.
As discussed in Section III, in the normal condition and without bad data interruption, the residual in (17) will be small. Thus, to mask the outage of a line, the value of must be increased to be greater than a threshold value such that the control center will trust the line still being connected.
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Note that in (18) ,∆θ m is based on the actual physical data and consistent with the case that the line is outaged. And ∆ is estimated using the received data from sensors. Without the interruption of bad data, the small residual is mainly attributed to the random measuring errors. However, if the data are modified to be consistent with the case that the line is connected, then the residual will be increased since ∆ is consistent with the case that the line is disconnected. The phase angle changes of PMU buses are thought to be caused by load variations.
To ensure the injected bad data can avoid being detected by the state estimator, as discussed in [16] , constraints (9)-(11) are satisfied to ensure the injected bad data obey KCL, KVL and attacking amount constraints.
The type of topology attacks could bring in serious consequences to the operation of power systems. Especially, a wise attacker choose a best attacking time, for example, when a system is under heavy load level, the outage of a critical line might lead to cascading failures. If the control center can detect the line outage immediately, corresponding measures will be taken to prevent or mitigate the risk. On the contrary, if such an outage is masked by an attacker and the control center has no way to detect the outage of the line, no actions will be taken. Since a DC power system is linear, it obeys the superstition law. If there is false data ∆ injected into the power grid, then∆ in (13) becomes
where ∆ is attributed to the false injection data ∆ ∆ = − . . ∆ (20) So, the equivalent post-outage power injection vector is
Then, the phase angle vector after line is outaged is calculated as
To ensure the constraints of attacking amounts, for the terminal buses of the target line,
Introducing (22) into (23) (16), since the residual due to the measuring errors of sensors in normal operation condition is small, similar to [3] , we can assume that = .Thus, the observed phase angle differences at PMU buses before and post the line outage can be approximately expressed as
With bad data, the vector of the change in phase angles at PMU buses is calculated as
According to the principle of line outage detection discussed in section B, to mask the outage of line , constraint (32) holds
Combining (21), (22), (30) and (31), (32) 
Thus, (33) is translated into
So, the entire optimization problem is formulated as min ∑ ∈ + 2 ∑ ∈ (36) subject to
Constraints (9)- (11), (34) And min ∑ ∈ + 2 ∑ ∈ (43)
Constraints (9)- (11), (35) It is assumed that the power flow of a line is measured in positive and negative directions, so the second term in the objective function is multiplied by 2. Constraints (37)- (38) count the number of load buses whose power injections are changed. Constraints (39)-(40) count the number of lines whose power flows are modified. Constraints (41)- (42) ensures that if a PMU is installed at a bus, then the power injection at the bus and the power flows of lines connected to the bus cannot be attacked. The optimization problem is a mixed integer linear programming, which can be solved by available commercial solvers, such as Cplex, Gurobi.
IV. CASE STUDY
In this section, we test the masking scheme using the IEEE 39-bus system [20] , which is composed of 39 buses and 46 lines as shown in figure 2 . For the purpose of illustration, loads at buses 3 and 27 are modified to 722MW and 381MW, respectively. We assume that this system is fully measured. That is, we need one meter to measure the injection power for each bus and two meters to measure the power flow passing through each transmission line.
In this paper we assume that an attacker can obtain the network information of the entire power network. Without loss of generality, we assume that the maximum attacking amount at a load bus is no more than 50% of the load. The mask of the outage of line 25-26 is used to demonstrate the proposed masking scheme. 
Without loss of generality, we assume that the minimum phase angle variations for the five PMUs are chosen as a random number between 0 and 0.1.The threshold value is set to 10. Then, solving the optimization problems (36) and (43), we get the false injection data into the measurements at load buses in table 1. The attacker needs to attack at least 31 measurements which include 7 power injection measurements and 24 line flow measurements. The false injection powers at bus measurements are listed in table 1. 
Compared (47) with (50), the residual is
The residual is greater than or equal to the threshold value 10, so constraints (34) and (35) are verified. Therefore, the defender cannot detect the outage of line 25-26 using the PMU data. To achieve such an attack, at least 7 bus injection power measurements and 24 line flow measurements must be attacked. The attacking region is a connected region, which includes the measurements at buses 8, 15, 20, 25, 26, 27, 39 and the measurements on lines 1-2, 1-39, 2-25, 8-9, 9-39, 15-16, 16-17, 16-19, 17-27, 19-20, 25-26 and 26-27. In table 2, the third column represents the line power flows after line 25-26 is disconnected. The fourth column gives the injected false data for line flow measurements, which is calculated using (28). The fifth column adds the third and fourth columns. The sixth column represents the line flows with bad data interruption after line 25-26 is disconnected. And the last column represents the simulated line flows, which are calculated by keeping line 25-26 connected through injecting corresponding powers at the terminal buses. It can be seen that ′′ and ′ have the same entries except the flow of the target line, which shows that the outage of line 25-26 can be simulated by injecting additional 113.71MW, -113.71MW at the terminal buses 25 and 26, respectively. The difference between the last column and the second column is the injected false data for line measurements, which is equal to ∆ calculated by (28). Hence, the correctness of the proposed method is verified. In other words, the attacker can design the false data of line measurements using (28) since the changes in line flows can be determined using (28) after ∆ is injected.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
Smart grids are subject to the high risk of cyber attacks due to the highly integrations of information and communication technologies. In this paper, with the consideration of PMU installation, we investigate a novel attack model to mask the outage of a single line by injecting false data into a set of measurements. A mixed integer linear programming is formulated to minimize the number of attacked measurements. In [16] , we showed that an attacker only needs to obtain the network information of the attacking region instead of that of the entire power grid. This is done by making sure that the variations of phase angles of all boundary buses connected to the same island of the non-attacking region are the same. In [17] , we further presented a heuristic algorithm to find an optimal attacking region which requires the reduced network information. In this paper, we assume that the attacker has the full network information of the power network. In the next work, we will investigate the possibility of launching such an attack based on local network information. Additionally, it is expected to develop effective protection strategies against such topology attacks.
